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In this paper, we describe a novel bidding strategy that autonomous trading agents can
use to participate in Continuous Double Auctions (CDAs). Our strategy is based on both
short and long-term learning that allows such agents to adapt their bidding behaviour
to be eﬃcient in a wide variety of environments. For the short-term learning, the agent
updates the aggressiveness of its bidding behaviour (more aggressive means it will trade off
proﬁt to improve its chance of transacting, less aggressive that it targets more proﬁtable
transactions and is willing to trade off its chance of transacting to achieve them) based on
market information observed after any bid or ask appears in the market. The long-term
learning then determines how this aggressiveness factor inﬂuences an agent’s choice of
which bids or asks to submit in the market, and is based on market information observed
after every transaction (successfully matched bid and ask). The principal motivation for the
short-term learning is to enable the agent to immediately respond to market ﬂuctuations,
while for the long-term learning it is to adapt to broader trends in the way in which the
market demand and supply changes over time. We benchmark our strategy against the
current state of the art (ZIP and GDX) and show that it outperforms these benchmarks
in both static and dynamic environments. This is true both when the population is
homogeneous (where the increase in eﬃciency is up to 5.2%) and heterogeneous (in
which case there is a 0.85 probability of our strategy being adopted in a two-population
evolutionary game theoretic analysis).
© 2008 Published by Elsevier B.V.
1. Introduction
The emergence of software agents that are capable of ﬂexible, autonomous actions and interactions is changing the
online trading landscape [12]. In particular, one of the most signiﬁcant applications of such agents is in the Continuous
Double Auction (CDA) [9], where multiple buyers and sellers compete with one another to buy and sell goods and services.
Such CDAs are one of the most common forms of marketplaces and have emerged as the dominant ﬁnancial institution for
trading securities and ﬁnancial instruments. Indeed, today, the major exchanges like the NASDAQ and the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) and the major foreign exchanges (FX) use variants of the CDA institution (with the total value of trades
on the NYSE standing at around a yearly 12.4 trillion dollars1 and foreign exchanges worth in excess of 1.9 trillion dollars2
of daily transactions). Other signiﬁcant applications are in market-based control [2], where CDAs provide a dynamic and
eﬃcient approach to the decentralised allocation of scarce resources. Examples of such market-oriented applications range
from the allocation of air pollution permits [15], to air-conditioning systems [3], to complex resource allocation problems
* Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: pv@ecs.soton.ac.uk (P. Vytelingum), dc@cs.bris.ac.uk (D. Cliff), nrj@ecs.soton.ac.uk (N.R. Jennings).
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because it exploits the dynamics of the free market to balance demand and supply eﬃciently in a highly responsive and
decentralised system. This is in contrast to most auctions that have a single, centralised auctioneer responsible for the
matching of participants and resources in the market. In the CDA, on the other hand, the resource allocation is an emergent
behaviour of the complex interactions of the individual trading agents, with transactions corresponding to allocations. Thus,
there is no single agent responsible for the allocation. This decentralisation allows the system to be very robust because
its performance degrades gracefully if agents fail, rather than having a single point of failure in the case of the centralised
auctioneer.
Given its prominence and importance, considerable research endeavour has been invested into devising strategies for
agents that participate in CDAs. However, there is no known dominant strategy [9]. Thus, many strategies have been de-
veloped as heuristic-based, decision-making algorithms that attempt to best exploit the observable market information
available to the agents in order to maximise their proﬁts (see Section 3). Indeed, several of these strategies have been
shown to outperform human traders in laboratory experiments [7]. However, we believe that more eﬃcient strategies can
still be developed and in this paper we develop just such a strategy.
In particular, to date, the extant CDA strategies have typically been developed assuming that the market is static, meaning
there is no change in demand and supply at the beginning of each trading day. However, real markets such as NASDAQ and
the NYSE are typically very dynamic, with changes frequently occurring (they are called market shocks). Thus, we believe
the eﬃciency of strategies in dynamic environments is central to their application in practice. Now, although some of the
designers have made initial attempts to show their strategies will still do well in dynamic markets, these strategies were not
developed explicitly for such environments. This is a shortcoming because we believe that there are fundamental differences
between static and dynamic environments. Speciﬁcally, these are primarily to do with the sporadically changing competitive
market equilibrium price which is where demand meets supply in the market (see Section 2 for more details). When we
have a market shock, the micro-economics of the free market dictates that the market dynamics, through the interaction
of the traders, will force the transaction prices to a new competitive equilibrium price [16]. Given this, the eﬃciency of a
strategy depends on how effective it is at adapting its bidding behaviour to the new market conditions, and thus to the new
competitive equilibrium price. From this, our intuition is that different behaviours are needed when the market is relatively
stable and when it is changing. In particular, in the static case, the agent can be effective by assuming that the competitive
equilibrium does not change signiﬁcantly, whereas in the dynamic case, it can make no such assumption and must learn,
assuming that this competitive equilibrium may change. Furthermore, for maximum generality, we want to ensure that our
strategy performs well in homogeneous populations in which all the agents use it (as would typically be the case in market-
based control applications) and in heterogeneous populations in which agents can adopt a range of alternate strategies (as
would be the case in ﬁnancial institutions). Given this, we simply assume that an agent is selﬁsh and tries to maximise its
individual return and that it is unaware of whether it is trading in a homogeneous or a heterogeneous environment.
Against this background, we have developed a novel bidding strategy for CDAs. In particular, we employ a short-term
and a long-term learning mechanism to update the agent’s bidding aggressiveness3 to remain competitive in the market. We
focus on aggressiveness, in particular, as we believe it is the key determinant of success in the market. It is central because
it describes how the agent manages the trade off between proﬁt and probability of transaction. Thus, an aggressive trading
agent tries to increase its chance of transacting by placing bids, that are not necessarily highly proﬁtable. In contrast, its
passive counterpart tries to transact at more proﬁtable prices, but has to trade off its chance of actually transacting. When
the agent is not able to transact, it could choose to become more aggressive, such that it increases its chances of being able
to transact, and, conversely, when it can transact, it could choose to become more passive in order to try to increase its
proﬁts. In other words, the agent could react to the market information by being more or less aggressive based on how it is
performing in the market. Given this, we employ a short-term learning mechanism to ﬁne-tune the agent’s aggressiveness
whenever it submits a bid or an ask, or a transaction occurs (if the bid and the ask match) in the market. The actual way
in which the degree of aggressiveness translates to a bid or an ask to submit in the market can be ﬁxed or can be linear, in
which case the aggressiveness would be similar to the agent’s proﬁt margin. However, we believe that this mapping should
be updated depending on the prevailing market conditions. Thus, we employ a long-term learning strategy that adapts this
mapping, in a non-linear fashion, to the changing conditions and, in particular, to the volatility of transaction prices. We
refer to this learning as long-term because the occurrence of bids and asks is a fraction of the number of transactions4 that
occur and because the beneﬁt of learning this mapping is only really observable over a number of trading days. The purpose
of the long-term learning is especially evident in dynamic markets where market conditions can change drastically and a
different mapping should then clearly be adopted. Hereafter, we refer to our strategy as the Adaptive-Aggressiveness (or AA)
strategy.
This work advances the state of the art in the following ways. First and most importantly, we develop a novel bidding
strategy, AA, with a short-term and a long-term learning mechanism that adapts to market conditions by being more or less
3 In some work, the trader’s risk attitude has been used to describe broadly the same behaviour [1]. However, we believe that such a property is intrinsic
to the trader, and thus, is not an appropriate term to describe our changing behaviour in this case.
4 During a trading round, multiple bids and asks are submitted until a bid and an ask match and a transaction occurs at the end of the round. There are
typically several trading rounds in a trading day.
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populations and heterogeneous populations (by being dominant or with probabilities of over 85% of being adopted in all
the different environments we consider). Second, we advance the state of the art in the methodology for analysing the CDA
within both homogeneous and heterogeneous populations. For the former, we look at the daily market eﬃciency and price
volatility, rather than simply the overall eﬃciency as is commonly done in the literature. This is an advance because our
methodology provides more insights into how the eﬃciency of a strategy changes as the strategies learn over the different
trading days and because it identiﬁes the drastic decrease in eﬃciency after a market shock. For the latter, we develop a
methodology with a novel two-population game theoretic model that analyses the buyers’ and sellers’ strategic behaviours
in the CDA. Here, we advance the state of the art by analysing the evolution of buyer and seller strategies in the market
which contrasts with the current state of the art that assumes an agent adopts the same strategy as both a buyer and a
seller. Finally, our work is the ﬁrst to systematically compare state of the art CDA strategies in a wide variety of (static and
dynamic) market settings, based on different types of demand and supply. It is also the ﬁrst work that considers a market
setting whereby the equilibrium price changes constantly over the trading days, which better reﬂects real markets, and,
indeed, we considered data from a real ﬁnancial market when designing such a setting.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. We begin, in Section 2, with a detailed description of the CDA
mechanism. We provide a detailed discussion of previous strategies that have been developed for the CDA and method-
ologies that have been used to analyse their effectiveness in Section 3. Section 4 details the AA strategy. We provide an
empirical evaluation of AA in both static and dynamic environments for both homogeneous and heterogeneous populations
in Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2. The continuous double auction mechanism
Market trading is governed by a market mechanism; deﬁned by a market protocol that determines the nature of bids
and asks allowed in the market, the clearing rule that indicates when a transaction occurs, the pricing rule that indicates
the price at which a transaction occurs and the information published to the buyers and sellers in the market. The CDA
is one such mechanism. However, there exist many variants, based on different market protocols. For example, in ﬁnancial
institutions like the NYSE, some traders have different levels of privilege with better access to other traders’ messages than
is available to unprivileged traders (usually to improve the overall eﬃciency of the system) or Dash et al. describe a variant
of the CDA for market-based control applications [8] (with modiﬁed clearing rules for inelastic demand).
These examples of the CDA are highly domain speciﬁc and diﬃcult to generalise from. Thus, most research in this area
(e.g. [6,11,22]) has generally been structured around the market protocol initially proposed by Smith [20]. In this, multiple
buyers and sellers are allowed to submit bids and asks in a market for homogeneous, single-attribute goods, and the market
clears (with a single trade) whenever a bid and an ask match (hence, the continuous nature of the CDA), and clears at the
average of the bid and the ask. Furthermore, the protocol includes the NYSE spread-improvement and the no-order queuing
rules. The former requires that a submitted bid or ask improves on the outstanding bid (the highest unmatched bid) or
the outstanding ask (the lowest unmatched ask) respectively, while the latter speciﬁes that offers are single-unit, are not
queued in the system, and are simply erased when a better offer is submitted. The CDA lasts several trading days, with a
trading day itself lasting several trading rounds which is the period during which bids and asks are submitted (with the
bid-ask spread decreasing) until the market clears.
To more formally analyse the CDA, we now explore some of these basic notions in more detail:
Deﬁnition 1. A trading day is the period (with a deadline) during which traders are allowed to submit bids and asks
(resulting in transactions whenever these match), at the end of which the market closes. At the beginning of a trading day,
traders are endowed with a set of goods to buy or sell (that determine the market demand and supply).
Deﬁnition 2. The outstanding bid, obid , is the current maximum (uncleared) bid submitted in the market.
Deﬁnition 3. The outstanding ask, oask , is the current minimum (uncleared) ask submitted in the market.
Deﬁnition 4. The bid-ask spread is the difference between obid and oask .
5 While at ﬁrst glance, the improvements may seem relatively small, there are a number of contextual factors that should be taken into account. First, the
CDA has already been shown to be an eﬃcient mechanism in many settings regardless of the trading strategy [11], such that the scope for improvement
is limited. Second, over the past 15 years, several strategies have been designed and improved upon, to be ever more eﬃcient. The evaluation of these
strategies in a common, but static, market setting [22] shows how they have systematically improved starting with the ZI strategy [11] (with a baseline
market eﬃciency of 98.3%), through the ZIP strategy [6] (with a market eﬃciency of 99.7%) and ﬁnally with the family of GD strategies [10] (with a market
eﬃciency of up to 99.7%). The work on the GDX strategy [21] showed that GD [10] was outperformed by the improved GDX which extracted 1.0% more
proﬁt, though the paper fails to provide the market eﬃciency using the GDX strategy. In our work, we were able to show that the AA strategy improves the
market eﬃciency of the CDA signiﬁcantly (with a considerably bigger leap than moving from ZIP to GD or to GDX), demonstrating a genuine advancement
of the state of the art.
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Deﬁnition 6. MAX is the maximum bid or ask allowed in the market (to prevent unreasonably high asks and speed up the
trading process).
Deﬁnition 7. A trading round is the period during which bids and asks are submitted until there is a match and a transac-
tion occurs. There are typically several trading rounds in a trading day. At the beginning of the trading round, obid = 0 and
oask = MAX.
Furthermore, as deﬁned by the model proposed by Smith and adopted in the literature, at the beginning of each trading
day, each agent is endowed with a set of limit prices corresponding to the goods it would like to buy or sell:
Deﬁnition 8. The limit price is the maximum bid a buyer is currently willing to offer, and the minimum ask a seller is
willing to offer.
Deﬁnition 9. i is the limit price of buyer i; that is the highest bid price it is willing to submit.
Deﬁnition 10. c j is the limit price of seller j; that is the lowest ask price it is willing to submit.
Finally, we deﬁne the following notions that we employ to analyse and evaluate the CDA mechanism:
Deﬁnition 11. The competitive market equilibrium is when demand meets supply in a free market populated by rational
and selﬁsh agents. According to the classical micro-economic theory, the transaction prices in the CDA are then expected
to converge towards that competitive equilibrium price p∗ . As p∗ can only be calculated if the demand and supply are
available, which is not the case here because of the decentralised nature of the CDA, p∗ cannot be known a priori.
Deﬁnition 12. The market eﬃciency is the ratio of all agents’ surpluses in the market to the maximum possible surplus
that would be obtained in an allocation where the proﬁts of all buyers and sellers are maximised.
Deﬁnition 13. The eﬃciency of a bidding strategy is the ratio of the proﬁts of the agents adopting that strategy during a
trading day to the maximum proﬁt these agents could extract in an eﬃcient, centralised allocation. In the homogeneous
scenario, this is identical to the market eﬃciency, while in a heterogeneous scenario, the mean eﬃciency of all the strategies
is equal to the market eﬃciency.
In our work, we consider a discrete-time simulator of such a CDA model, and at each time step, an agent is randomly
triggered to submit a bid or an ask in the market. In line with previous work, we impose a deadline on the duration of a
trading day with the auction closing after 1000 time steps. Now, for controlled experiments, we specify single-unit or multi-
unit allocations6 endowed to buyers and sellers at the beginning of a trading day, to induce a desired demand and supply
for the market. In particular, limit prices are drawn from uniform distributions Ub and Us for buyers and sellers respectively.
We chose a uniform distribution in order to obtain an expected linearly decreasing demand curve and an expected linearly
increasing supply curve, commonly found in the micro-economics literature [16]. For the purposes of this paper, we consider
the following different uniform distributions to model representative (symmetric7 and asymmetric) markets similar to those
considered in previous studies [5,6,22] (see Fig. 1), and we further describe how we use such markets to induce market
shocks.
• Market 1 (M1): Ub = U(1.5,4.5)8 and Us = U(1.5,4.5). This is a symmetric market that has an expected competitive
equilibrium price, p∗ = 3.0.
• Market 2 (M2): Ub = U(1.5,4.5) and Us = U(2.8,3.2). An asymmetric market with a ﬂat supply curve. p∗ = 3.0.
• Market 3 (M3): Ub = U(2.8,3.2) and Us = U(1.5,4.5). An asymmetric market with a ﬂat demand curve. p∗ = 3.0.
• Market 4 (M4): Ub = U(2.5,5.5) and Us = U(2.5,5.5). A symmetric market with p∗ = 4.0.
Deﬁnition 14. A market shock is a sudden change in agents’ preferences (their limit prices) and, hence, in the market de-
mand and supply, but not necessarily in the competitive equilibrium price. In our case, the shock occurs at the beginning
6 A single-unit allocation is when a trader is given a single unit (with a corresponding limit price) to buy or sell. A multi-unit allocation is when a trader
is given multiple units (with a corresponding set of limit prices) to buy or sell.
7 In a symmetric market, the ratio of the gradient of the demand curve and that of the supply curve is −1. M1 is an example of a symmetric market,
while M2 is that of an asymmetric market (see Fig. 1).
8 U(u, v) is a uniform distribution between u and v .
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of a trading day with the new set of endowment of limit prices to the trading agents. There are different types of dynamic
changes in real markets that are not referred to as market shocks, e.g. rallies (sustained upward movement of the compet-
itive equilibrium price), sell-offs (sustained downward movement of the competitive equilibrium price), movements/trends
(less sustained upward or downwards shifts). However, because it is not a central aspect of this work, we generalise the
meaning of market shocks to cover all of these in this paper.
In more detail, M1 and M4 have symmetric demand and supply (they differ only in their competitive equilibrium price).
By considering cases with a ﬂat demand (M3) or a ﬂat supply (M2), we want to see how such extreme asymmetry will affect
the eﬃciency of buyer and seller strategies in the CDA. Speciﬁcally, we did not want to constrain our study to symmetric
demand and supply, which others have done [21,22], because we want to contrast the eﬃciencies of strategies in markets
with different demand and supply, and observe what effect this has on the strategic interactions of agents. Finally, the
purpose of M4 is to observe how the strategies perform when the competitive equilibrium price changes during a market
shock. This is important to see how fast the strategies can adapt to the new equilibrium, given that the slower they adapt,
the longer they remain ineﬃcient.
In a static environment, a CDA typically lasts several trading days, with trading agents receiving the same set of limit
prices at the beginning of each trading day. However, because dynamic environments are commonplace (see Section 1) we
also need to investigate the eﬃciency of our strategy in such situations. To this end, as per previous work including Smith’s,
we induce a market shock by changing the market demand and supply. This is effected by changing the endowment of limit
prices at the beginning of a trading day. For example, for a CDA lasting 20 trading days, we could use M1 for the ﬁrst 10 and
M4 for the last 10 trading days, effectively inducing a shock on Day 11 (see Fig. 2). Hereafter, we identify a market shock
(MS) by the different markets it involves, and in our example, such a shock would then be identiﬁed as MS14 to signify the
fact that it is moving from M1 to M4.
Furthermore, and in order to be more realistic, we consider a scenario based on real market data from NASDAQ. In
particular, we consider the history of Google shares (NASDAQ:GOOG) to analyse the performance of CDA strategies in a
market where the demand and supply changes constantly every day (which could potentially affect learning strategies). The
purpose of using real market data is to analyse how the changing demand and supply affects the eﬃciency over trading
days, rather than during a trading day. Given this, such an estimation of the equilibrium price is satisfactory for the CDA
model where we assume that the demand and supply does not change during a trading day. Now, because in a real market,
the market demand and supply changes during the trading day (while it does not in the standard CDA model), we estimate
the equilibrium price (see Fig. 3) as an average of the highest and the lowest transaction prices during each trading day.
Within this context, in our experiments, we consider two speciﬁc sub-markets. The ﬁrst one is based on the segment A to
B (see Fig. 3), which we will refer as the GOOG market hereafter. This is typical of the market ﬂuctuations that are most
common in real markets. The other one is a more dynamic market, based on segment C to D (see Fig. 3), which we will
refer to as GOOGshock, where the market experiences a sharp and sustained drop in the transaction prices.
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Fig. 3. History of GOOG share prices (July 2007 to December 2007). Segment A to B corresponds to the GOOG market while segment C to D correspond to
the GOOGshock market.
3. Related work
Research on CDAs was signiﬁcantly advanced by Smith’s seminal work [20] on competitive market behaviour. He showed
that in CDAs populated by a relatively small number of selﬁsh human traders, the market eﬃciency achieved in such a
decentralised environment, where no single agent has complete and perfect information about the system, was close to one
(the maximum possible value—see Deﬁnition 12). This result was ground-breaking as it showed that markets governed by
a decentralised mechanism, such as the CDA, do not have to be large to be eﬃcient, as had previously been assumed [16].
As we will see, many subsequent research endeavours in this area have been heavily inﬂuenced by this work and we have
also adopted the same broad methodology for the market and agent setup. In this section, we review, in turn, the work
on strategies for the CDA and on analysing strategic interactions in such an institution since both of these are necessary to
understand the contributions of this work.
3.1. Strategies for CDAs
In more detail, many strategies for the CDA have subsequently been developed, and over the last decade, there has been
considerable emphasis on strategies for software trading agents with the emergence of electronic markets. In 1992, for ex-
ample, the Santa Fe Trading Agent Competition [9] was organised to ﬁnd the most eﬃcient CDA strategy (see Deﬁnition 13)
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conditions and submits an offer to buy or sell only when one of the following conditions is met:
(1) For the buyer (seller), the best ask (bid) is less (higher) than the minimum transaction price in the previous trading
day.
(2) For the buyer (seller), the best ask (bid) is less (higher) than the maximum transaction price in the previous trading
day and the ratio of the bid-ask spread and the best ask (bid) is less than some spread factor, while the expected proﬁt
is more than some minimum proﬁt factor.
(3) The fraction of time remaining in the trading day is less than some time factor (hence the reference to being a sniping
strategy).
However, it was also shown in an evolutionary tournament9 that the Kaplan strategy does not perform well when a
majority of the trading agent population adopt it [9]. This is because Kaplan has a simple reactive behaviour and does not
learn to be more eﬃcient in the market given the changing market conditions. Indeed, it works primarily by exploiting
the more complex (adaptive) behaviours of other strategies that are learning to be more eﬃcient in the market, and as it
becomes a bigger proportion of the market, there are fewer agents to exploit. Hence, its performance decreases.
Another important piece of work in the literature is the Zero-Intelligence (ZI) strategy by Gode and Sunder [11]. A ZI
agent makes an uninformed, but proﬁtable decision that is not based on observed market information. In particular, a ZI
buyer submits an offer drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and its limit price, and a ZI seller between its limit
price and the maximum offer, MAX, allowed in the market. Gode and Sunder showed that CDAs populated by these non-
intelligent trading agents were still highly eﬃcient. They then conjectured that the high market eﬃciency was principally
due to the structure of the market mechanism (i.e. its protocol), rather than how intelligent the agents were. Their work
was subsequently critiqued by Cliff and Bruten who argued that the high eﬃciency observed was in fact an artefact of the
symmetric demand and supply considered, and that at least a minimal intelligence is necessary to achieve eﬃciency that is
comparable to that of CDAs with human traders [20]. They justiﬁed their critique by developing the Zero-Intelligence Plus
(ZIP) strategy [6] which, indeed, was shown to achieve market eﬃciency close to that of human traders, and to considerably
outperform the ZI strategy. The ZIP strategy’s minimal intelligence is that it learns its best proﬁt margin (to maximise its
proﬁts while attempting to trade) given a set of six different rules that decide whether to increase or decrease the proﬁt
margin based on market information. In particular, the proﬁt margin is updated after every market event (a bid or an ask
being submitted, or a transaction occurring), and there are 8 parameters covering things such as the learning mechanism
(including the learning rate and the momentum coeﬃcient10) that determines how this margin is updated, the initial proﬁt
margin and the relative and absolute increase and decrease in proﬁt margin.
An alternate approach is adopted by the GD strategy [10] and its subsequent extension GDX [21]. GD is an expected
proﬁt-maximising and belief-based strategy. Speciﬁcally, it calculates its belief that a bid or an ask will be accepted in the
market based on a set of the most recent transactions and submitted, but unaccepted, bids and asks, and the expected proﬁt
associated with such bids and asks. Then, the bid or ask that maximises the expected proﬁt is submitted in the market. GDX
calculates the belief in a similar manner, but uses dynamic programming (coupled with the expected proﬁt maximisation
process) to decide on the best price and when to submit a bid or an ask. This improved version adds another dimension to
the decision-making process, namely time as the expected number of bidding opportunities before the auction closes. This
means the GDX agent has the opportunity to trade later on during the trading day and can thus wait for more proﬁtable
transactions. The GD family contrasts with ZIP particularly in how the latter learns its proﬁt margin. In fact, ZIP uses a scalar
parameter, based on the latest bid or ask or transaction price, while GD builds up its belief using a set of bids, asks and
transaction prices over a number of the most recent trading rounds. The GD approach is signiﬁcantly more computationally
intensive than the ZIP approach, particularly when coupled with the dynamic programming, but has been proven to be
more effective in symmetric markets given homogeneous and heterogeneous populations [21].
Other strategies have also been developed, including the FL strategy [13] which uses fuzzy logic to form a bid or an ask
to submit in the market and the modiﬁed Roth–Erev strategy based on a myopic reinforcement-learning algorithm [17,18].
However, in this paper, we will consider only ZIP and GDX when benchmarking our AA strategy. We chose these because
they are the two most widely used benchmarking strategies in the literature (being used in [7,28]). Moreover, they have
also been shown to be the most eﬃcient [21,22].
3.2. Evaluating strategic interactions in CDAs
Given the benchmarks, we now require a methodology for analysing the strategic interactions of agents adopting our
strategy or these benchmarks in both homogeneous and heterogeneous populations. For the homogeneous case, the emer-
gent behaviour of the market is most interesting from a system designer’s perspective. For the heterogeneous case, the
9 In an evolutionary tournament, at the beginning of each run of the CDA, the proportion of strategies being adopted corresponds to their relative
eﬃciencies [9]. Thus, the more eﬃcient strategies will be more common in the market.
10 The momentum-based update of the ZIP strategy considers the movement of the bids and asks submitted in the market to minimise the effect of high
frequency change in these bids and asks. The momentum coeﬃcient is then the weight given to previous bids and asks [6].
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ent strategies in the market is also important. Thus, these two types of population require a different type of evaluation
methodology and, so, we deal with each in turn.
In homogeneous populations, previous work has typically looked at the average eﬃciency of a strategy over several
trading days, in static markets with symmetric demand and supply (e.g., [10,22]). However, we believe this has a number of
shortcomings.
First, analysing the daily eﬃciency of a strategy provides more insight into how effective it is in learning from market
interactions. This view is partly supported by [6], though they focus on the daily price volatility. Speciﬁcally, we believe that
as the agent learns to be more competitive in a static market and the transaction prices converge towards the competitive
equilibrium price, we expect its eﬃciency to improve. Thus, it is important to measure eﬃciency on a daily basis because it
gives us insights into how the behaviour of the market is changing and, in particular, how it is improving. Moreover, such
observations would not be possible if we just focused on average eﬃciency because we end up with a scalar value that does
not say anything about the trend of the daily eﬃciencies.
Second, we believe that daily price volatility, α, should also be looked at. To date, however, only Cliff and Bruten consider
such a metric:
α = 1
p∗
√∑N
i=1(pi − p∗)2
N
, (1)
where pi is the price of transaction i, and N is the number of transactions over which we are investigating the conver-
gence. Because the competitive market equilibrium is usually central in a strategy, the price volatility, calculated as Smith’s
parameter (see Eq. (1)), is important because it gives insights into how the agents adjust their behaviours such that the
transaction prices converge to that equilibrium. The rate of convergence usually determines how fast the market reaches a
high eﬃciency and, thus, is useful in analysing the effectiveness of a strategy in a homogeneous population.
Third, only Cliff and Bruten have looked at dynamic environments with different market demand and supply. However,
they only describe how transaction prices change, and not how daily eﬃciency and price volatility change in such environ-
ments. This is important because, as discussed in Section 1, we are considering decentralised resource allocation in both
static and dynamic environments. Thus, it is interesting to analyse how daily eﬃciency and price volatility change in both
types of environments. Furthermore, because demand and supply cannot be known a priori, we must ensure that the strate-
gies are evaluated in markets with different types of representative demand and supply, and not simply the standard cases
(with symmetric demand and supply) to ensure the signiﬁcance of our analysis.
In sum, given these shortcoming, we will use an analytical method that considers both market eﬃciency and price
volatility, on a daily basis, to highlight this learning in both static and dynamic markets with different market demand and
supply (see Section 2 for more details).
When we consider methodologies for evaluating strategies in heterogeneous populations, we come across two principal
approaches. The ﬁrst one (adopted in [21,22,27]) consists of comparing the eﬃciency of strategies in balanced populations
(where strategies are adopted in equal proportions). However, this approach fails to consider unbalanced populations where
strategies are present to different degrees. The second one, proposed by Walsh et al. (2002) and adopted in [18,26], does
allow unbalanced populations. This approach is important because a strategy might perform better or worse based on the
number of buyers and sellers that adopt it, an insight which would allow us to better evaluate a strategy and, thus, we
consider this approach in this work.
In particular, Walsh et al. propose an evolutionary game-theoretic (EGT) approach based on computing the mixed-Nash
equilibrium of heuristic strategies and the dynamics analysis of equilibrium convergence [29]. Such an EGT analysis is
insightful because it has been shown to approximate the learning of agents (using a standard learning technique such as
reinforcement learning) in a multi-agent system [23,24], which, in our case, translates to traders learning to adopt the better
strategies in the market. Now, because an EGT analysis is infeasible for all but the simplest games (such as the Prisoner’s
Dilemma [29]), Walsh et al. describe how complex games that involve repeated interactions with more elaborate actions
and payoffs, can be made amenable to such analysis. Speciﬁcally, their model considers the high-level, heuristic strategies
of the trading agents as simple actions, and the payoff to these strategies is the average proﬁt extracted in the market (by
so doing, they essentially abstract a complex iterated game to a simple normal-form one). To illustrate their approach, they
apply it to two different games, namely the Automated Dynamic Pricing (ADP) game and the CDA game. In the former, they
analyse how sellers endowed with a set of heuristic strategies interact in the market, and what strategies these sellers are
most likely to adopt. In the latter, they consider the strategic interaction of agents that use the same strategy as a buyer and
a seller. Their methodology has now been widely adopted and, in particular, [18] used it to compare two different auction
mechanisms (the continuous and the call double auction mechanism) where similar strategies were available for both.
The EGT approach to evaluating strategies in heterogeneous populations (in the more general case of unbalanced popula-
tions) is indeed more insightful than simply comparing the eﬃciencies of strategies in balanced populations. However, a key
assumption of this approach is that an agent will adopt the same heuristic strategy even when it has to perform different
roles (such as being a buyer and a seller). In games like the ADP, where agents have a single role (as a competing seller),
such an assumption does not constrain the analysis, and their methodology is appropriate. However, in double-sided games,
like the CDA, such an assumption is both unrealistic and unnecessarily restrictive. In practice, buyers and sellers usually
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and sellers adopt, and the demand and supply of the market then determines the complex interactions of these strategies
which in turn, determines their overall effectiveness. To maximise its proﬁt, we believe an agent should be allowed to select
whatever is the best strategy for it when acting as a buyer and whatever is the best for it as a seller. The present constraint
of compromising on both and having to select the same strategy for both roles can only have a negative effect on the
agent’s economic eﬃciency. We believe that such an assumption should not be made because this approach may well miss
some important phenomena. Thus, an EGT approach to analyse how the buyer and seller strategies separately evolve in the
market is needed. Now, just such an approach is developed in [25] and it is shown to offer new insights into the strategic
behaviour of agents in the CDA when compared with Walsh et al.’s model. Given this, we also deploy this method in this
work (see Section 5.1.4 for more details).
4. The AA bidding strategy
In this section, we describe our AA strategy in detail. As argued in Section 1, given that an agent can make a more
informed decision based on every additional piece of information observed in the market, being adaptive to new market
conditions can allow it to be more proﬁtable. Here, the market conditions describe all observed information and how it
leads to the history of transaction prices and the current outstanding bid and ask. For this reason, in the AA strategy, we
adapt the degree of aggressiveness in the agent’s bidding strategy to reﬂect its beliefs about the prevailing market situation.
Speciﬁcally:
Deﬁnition 15. Aggressiveness is deﬁned as the inclination to interact more actively in the market. The aggressive trader
submits better offers than what it believes the competitive equilibrium price to be, to try and improve its chance of trans-
acting, and trades off proﬁt for that purpose. The passive trader is less inclined to transact and more inclined to try and win
a proﬁtable transaction and thus submits offers that are worse than what it believes the competitive equilibrium price to be.
The active trader submits offers at what it believes is the competitive equilibrium price, which is the expected transaction
price.
Thus, the agent can adopt behaviours that have different levels of aggressiveness, r ∈ [−1,1], ranging from aggressive
(r < 0), through active at r = 0, to passive (r > 0), coupled with a learning mechanism to decide upon this level. Speciﬁcally,
an agent that adopts a passive strategy waits for more proﬁtable transactions than its estimate of p∗ (hereafter the estimate
is denoted by pˆ∗) and is willing to trade off its chance of transacting for higher expected proﬁt. In contrast, an aggressive
strategy trades off proﬁt to improve its probability of transacting in the market. The active agent attempts to transact at pˆ∗
which is the expected transaction price. Now, because market conditions keep changing, different levels of aggressiveness
are likely to be best at different times and so the agent needs a means for updating r. Thus, an AA agent has two principal
decision-making components: (i) a bidding one that speciﬁes what bid or ask should be submitted based on its current de-
gree of aggressiveness, and (ii) a learning mechanism to update its behaviour according to the prevailing market conditions.
In more detail, these two components can be represented by two distinct layers, the bidding layer and the adaptive layer
(see Fig. 4).
The ﬁrst layer determines which bids or asks to submit given a set of bidding rules (see Section 4.4). These rules specify
how to react to the current market conditions given the target price τ which represents the agent’s most competitive price
in the market. A bid (or ask) is competitive if it is the agent’s most proﬁtable bid (or ask) that it believes would be accepted
in the market. Note that a bid is always less than or equal to, and the ask always more than or equal to, its limit price.
This is similar to the price given by the ZIP agent’s proﬁt margin and the price that maximises the GDX agent’s expected
proﬁt. Now, the aggressiveness model, as described in detail in Section 4.2, gives a mapping function to τ of the agent’s
current degree of aggressiveness, its limit price, pˆ∗ (which is provided by the equilibrium estimator described in Section 4.1),
and an intrinsic parameter θ . In particular, θ determines the shape of that mapping function (see Section 4.2 for more
details).
The second layer represents the adaptive part of the strategy where the agent updates its bidding behaviour, when
triggered by a market event (when a transaction occurs or a new bid or ask is submitted). This update causes the agent to
adopt a more passive behaviour if it believes it can transact at a higher proﬁt or a more aggressive one if it believes it is
targeting too high a proﬁt to transact. In particular, we have short-term and long-term learning mechanisms that update
the agent’s bidding behaviour. The former updates the degree of aggressiveness, r, whenever a bid or ask is submitted and
is described in more detail in Section 4.3.1. The latter updates θ in the aggressiveness model after every transaction and is
described in more detail in Section 4.3.2.
Each component of our strategy is now described in turn, in the following subsections, before the eﬃciency of the
strategy is empirically benchmarked (in Section 5).
4.1. The equilibrium estimator
Because p∗ cannot be known a priori, we use the moving average method for calculating it, based on the history of
transaction prices (see Eq. (2)). We make this choice because the moving average is an objective analytical tool that gives
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the average value over a time frame spanning from the last transaction. Moreover, it is sensitive to price changes over
a short time frame, but over a longer time span, is less sensitive and ﬁlters out the high-frequency components of the
signal within the frame. Moving average thus allows us to emphasise the direction of a trend and smooth out large price
ﬂuctuations and, thus, we believe this is a reasonable choice. Based on our assumption that the transaction prices converge
to the competitive equilibrium price, we introduce the notion of recency in the moving average by giving more weight to the
more recent transaction prices. Speciﬁcally, Eq. (2) describes how we calculate the estimate of the competitive equilibrium
price, denoted by pˆ∗ , given a set of the N most recent transaction prices:
pˆ∗ =
∑T
i=T−N(wi × pi)
N
, where
T∑
i=T−N+1
wi = 1, wi−1 = ρwi (2)
where (wT−N+1, . . . ,wT ) is the weight given to the N most recent transaction prices, (pT−N+1, . . . , pT ), and T is the latest
transaction. Based on simulations, we set ρ to a value of 0.9 to emphasise any converging pattern in the history (see Fig. 9
for an example).
4.2. The aggressiveness model
The role of the aggressiveness model is to generate the current target price, τ , given the agent’s current degree of ag-
gressiveness r. In this context, an agent can be of two types; namely, intra-marginal and extra-marginal. A buyer (seller)
is intra-marginal if its limit price is higher (lower) than the competitive equilibrium price. In contrast, the extra-marginal
buyer’s (seller’s) limit price is lower (higher) than the competitive equilibrium price. Now, in a centralised mechanism with
an eﬃcient allocation (market eﬃciency is 1), only intra-marginal agents transact, while extra-marginal ones do not. How-
ever, in a decentralised mechanism, while intra-marginal agents are expected to transact, and extra-marginal counterparts
are not, the latter do sometimes succeed in transacting. This is because transaction prices are never exactly at p∗ , and
thus, extra-marginal buyers can exploit asks below p∗ , and extra-marginal sellers bids above p∗ . In such cases, when the
extra-marginal traders do transact, the allocation is no longer eﬃcient and the market eﬃciency dips below 1.
Our aggressiveness model differs for these two type of traders fundamentally because of their limit prices and whether
they are expected to transact given p∗ . Given this, we consider them each in turn.
First, we consider the intra-marginal trader. In its aggressiveness model, a target price equal to pˆ∗ implies that the trader
is active. When an intra-marginal agent adopts a passive behaviour, it considers a target price that is below (for the buyer)
or an ask that is above (for the seller) p∗ , in order to obtain a higher (than expected at pˆ∗) proﬁt margin. Conversely, an
aggressive attitude implies that the intra-marginal trader targets bids above (asks below) the competitive equilibrium price,
which improves the probability of its bids (asks) being accepted (but decreases its proﬁt margin).
For the intra-marginal aggressiveness model, we identiﬁed the following constraints that it should satisfy over the dif-
ferent degrees of aggressiveness. In particular, when the buyer is completely aggressive (r = −1), it targets a bid at its
limit price and when it is completely passive (r = 1), it targets a bid at 0 (for maximum proﬁt but no chance of actually
transacting). The active buyer (r = 0) targets a bid at pˆ∗ . Therefore, the aggressiveness function is deﬁned at these three
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speciﬁc aggressiveness levels. Similar intuitions apply for the seller’s aggressiveness function. However, when (r = −1), the
seller submits the maximum ask, MAX (see Deﬁnition 6), allowed in the market. Given these constraints, there is an inﬁnite
solution space for such a function and so we choose a parameterised function11 (see Fig. 5) within the solution space with
θ determining the behaviour of the function (that is its rate of change with respect to the degree of aggressiveness r).
Speciﬁcally, Eqs. (3) and (4) detail the intra-marginal buyer’s and seller’s aggressiveness model (and its relationship
between r and τ ). We adopt these particular functions because they are continuous (and thus, we do not have sudden
jumps of τ as r changes) and θ allows the agent to explicitly specify the properties of the function. When θ is high, the
magnitude of the gradient tends to 0 at r = 0 and increases as θ tends to −1. Conversely, when θ is low, the magnitude
of the gradient is high at r = 0 and thus allows faster update of the target price as r changes. A slow update is required
when the transaction prices are converging to pˆ∗ , while a fast update is required at the beginning of the auction or after
a market shock, when market conditions are changing considerably. Indeed, experimental results described in [27] suggest
that the effectiveness of our bidding strategy depends on the value θ . In particular, we observed from market simulations
that a high θ is more beneﬁcial when the prices are converging towards pˆ∗ and it is not proﬁtable to deviate too much
from pˆ∗ . When faced with a high price volatility (with all agents still exploring the market), an agent is then better off with
a low θ to also explore the market by allowing a faster update of its degree of aggressiveness. In Section 4.3.2, we describe
how updating θ , and thus the aggressiveness model, after every transaction can be beneﬁcial in the long term.
For an intra-marginal buyer,
τ =
⎧⎨
⎩
pˆ∗
(
1− e−rθ−1
eθ−1
)
if r ∈ (−1,0),
pˆ∗ + (i − pˆ∗)
( erθ−1
eθ−1
)
if r ∈ (0,1),
(3)
where θ is calculated such that the function is continuous as r = 0, that is there is no jump in the ﬁrst derivative of τ .
For an intra-marginal seller,
τ =
⎧⎨
⎩
pˆ∗ + (MAX − pˆ∗)( e−rθ−1
eθ−1
)
if r ∈ (−1,0),
c j + (pˆ∗ − c j)
(
1− ( erθ−1
eθ−1
))
if r ∈ (0,1),
(4)
where θ is calculated such that the function is continuous as r = 0, that is there is no jump in the ﬁrst derivative of τ .
Now, for the above equations, the marginal trader is a limiting case, where i = pˆ∗ and c j = pˆ∗ . However, these equations
are not valid in the extra-marginal case where the seller cannot ask below pˆ∗ and the buyer cannot bid above pˆ∗ . In such
11 While a range of functions could have been used, our choice was a basic function family where fθ (x) = (eθx − 1)/(eθ − 1), which, for x ∈ [0,1], takes
values between 0 and 1, with fθ (0) = 0; fθ (1) = 1, and second derivative proportional to 1/(eθ − 1), so that fθ is concave when θ is negative, convex
when θ is positive.
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situations, the extra-marginal buyer and seller modify their aggressiveness functions to that of Fig. 6. This reﬂects the fact
that the extra-marginal trader cannot be aggressive and its degree of aggressiveness, r, is clipped at 0 such that it will
submit its limit price to maximise its chance of transacting. For this case, Eqs. (5) and (6) describe that aggressiveness
function precisely:
For an extra-marginal buyer,
τ =
{
i
(
1− e−rθ−1
eθ−1
)
if r ∈ (−1,0),
i if r ∈ (0,1).
(5)
For an extra-marginal seller,
τ =
{
c j + (MAX − c j)
( e−rθ−1
eθ−1
)
if r ∈ (−1,0),
c j if r ∈ (0,1).
(6)
We next look at the adaptive layer of the AA strategy, where the agent learns its degree of aggressiveness and its
aggressiveness model.
4.3. The adaptive layer
The adaptive layer consists of the short and long-term learning mechanisms that update r and θ respectively. In the
following subsections, we describe each of these in more detail.
4.3.1. Short-term learning
In the short-term mechanism, the agent uses a set of learning rules (summarised in Fig. 7) to update its aggressiveness,
every time a bid or an ask is submitted or a transaction occurs in the market. It performs this in order to better ﬁt the
prevailing market conditions. Speciﬁcally, a simple continuous learning algorithm, the Widrow–Hoff algorithm [30] (initially
adopted in the ZIP strategy), is used to increase or decrease the aggressiveness, r(t), at time step t (see Eq. (7)).
In more detail, the aim here is to adapt the agent’s aggressiveness to the current desired aggressiveness, δ(t), which
represents the degree of aggressiveness that would allow the buyer to bid the minimum of its limit price and a price
slightly higher than the outstanding bid or the seller to ask the maximum of its limit price and a price slightly lower than
the outstanding ask. Here, δ(t) is a factor of rshout , the degree of aggressiveness that would form a price equal to the bid b,
if the agent is a buyer and the last event was a bid, or to the ask, a, if the agent is a seller and the last event was an ask,
or to the transaction q, whether the agent is a buyer or a seller and if the last event was a transaction (see bidding rules in
Fig. 7). When the agent is decreasing its degree of aggressiveness (to be more proﬁtable), it sets δ(t) to slightly lower than
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if (transaction occurs at price q)
if (τ  q) buyer must be less aggressive
else buyer must be more aggressive
else if (bid, b, submitted)
if (τ  b) buyer must be more aggressive
Learning Rules for Seller j:
if (transaction occurs at price q)
if (τ  q) seller must be less aggressive
else seller must be more aggressive
else if (ask, a, submitted)
if (τ  a) seller must be more aggressive
Fig. 7. Short-term learning rules.
rshout (negative λr and λa) so that the target price is higher than the outstanding bid or lower than the outstanding ask.
When it is increasing its degree of aggressiveness (to improve its chance of transacting), it sets δ(t) to slightly higher than
rshout (positive λr and λa). The algorithm then enacts a continuous-space learning process that backprojects a fraction of the
error between the desired degree of aggressiveness, δ(t), and the degree of aggressiveness, r(t), onto the same degree of
aggressiveness r(t). As r(t) updates, it gradually follows the changing δ(t) at a rate dependent on the learning parameter β1.
A reasonable value of β1 is chosen.12 Speciﬁcally,
r(t + 1) = r(t) + β1
(
δ(t) − r(t)),
δ(t) = (1± λr)rshout ± λa, (7)
where β1 ∈ (0,1) is the learning rate of the algorithm which inﬂuences the rate of change of r(t) and, hence, of the target
price, τ . λr and λa are the relative and absolute increase or decrease in rshout , respectively.
The learning rules employed here are broadly similar to those of the ZIP strategy. We employ its learning mechanism
because it has been shown to effectively exploit market information. However, rather than updating a proﬁt margin, we
employ the mechanism to update the agent’s degree of aggressiveness. We also simplify the adaptive mechanism by not
considering a momentum-based update, since the manner in which the aggressiveness is updated with respect to the
competitive equilibrium price minimises any high-frequency change in the bid or ask prices. In more detail, when the
buyer’s target price is greater than the transaction price, this implies that the buyer can transact and so it should try to be
more proﬁtable in the next round by being less aggressive. If its target price is less than the transaction price, this suggests
that the buyer cannot transact at its target price, and thus should increase it by being more aggressive. Similar intuitions
apply for the seller’s learning rules. An example of how the level of aggressiveness changes in a speciﬁc scenario is given in
Fig. 9. Here, we observe how the AA trader is generally passive (and r is negative), waiting for a proﬁtable transaction (just
below the equilibrium price for the buyer and just above for the seller). Sometimes, the AA traders becomes aggressive (and
r is positive) when it is not transacting, which is typically at the beginning of a trading day or following a market shock.
4.3.2. Long-term learning
As described in Section 4.2, θ inﬂuences the bidding behaviour. Given this, we now describe how we can learn such a
parameter on a long-term basis, after every transaction, to improve the eﬃciency of AA. The underlying intuition here is
that different values of θ are best within different market conditions and, in particular, the best values of θ depend on the
price volatility. Given this, we update θ (after every transaction) through a learning process based on the price volatility,
which we measure as an approximation of Smith’s α-parameter (see Section 3), given that the agent only has an estimate
of the competitive equilibrium price. Eq. (8) describes the learning mechanism:
θ(t + 1) = θ(t) + β2
(
θ∗(α) − θt
)
,
α =
√
1
N
∑T
i=T−N+1(pi − pˆ∗)2
pˆ∗
, (8)
where β2 ∈ (0,1) is the learning rate of the algorithm that determines how θ adapts. In particular, θ∗(α) is a function
(see Fig. 8) that determines the desired θ parameter given the current price volatility calculated as Smith’s coeﬃcient of
convergence α over a window of the N latest prices. pi is the price of transaction i, and T is the most recent transaction.
θ∗(α) is given by Eq. (9) and shown in Fig. 8. Based on simulation results for different environments, we chose this particular
function as an approximation to the optimal θ parameter that maximises performance given the price volatility. Our function
is only an approximation since it is averaged over the optimal θ for a number of different market environments. The exact
environment and, thus, the exact optimal θ , are unknown a priori. Speciﬁcally,
12 As we will see in Section 5.1.6, λ and β1 are not sensitive to the performance of the strategy and, thus, to the results we report here.
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α¯ = (α − αmin)/(αmax − αmin)
θ∗(α) = (θmax − θmin)
(
1− α¯eγ (α¯−1))+ θmin (9)
where [θmin, θmax] is the range over which we update θ , αmax is the maximum α that occurs in the market, and αmin is the
minimum α. γ determines the shape of the function. We will show that the choice of γ is not central to this work through
a sensitivity analysis (see Section 5.1.6).
Given the mechanism, we now consider an example of how θ changes in a speciﬁc scenario in Fig. 9. In particular, θ
updates after every transaction, as speciﬁed by Eq. (8), it is ﬁxed at a reasonable value of −4 for the ﬁrst few transaction
prices (until a reasonable estimate of the competitive equilibrium price is obtained) and then updated to settle at θmax
(around 2) as the transaction prices converge to the competitive equilibrium price (2.65). When a market shock is identiﬁed
by the sudden increase in α (at Day 11), θ gradually decreases towards θmin (until α starts decreasing) to give a faster
update of the target price τ (see Section 4.2). As the agents’ behaviours gradually adapt to the new market demand and
supply and the transaction prices converge towards the new competitive equilibrium price (3.82), θ gradually increases back
to a high value (around 2) that is more suitable for a low price volatility.
Furthermore, in Section 5.4, and more speciﬁcally in Fig. 25, we report on the eﬃciency of our strategy without the
learning mechanism to demonstrate the importance of adapting the aggressiveness. In detail, we ﬁxed the aggressiveness
level at 0 (that is the AA trader is always active). We observed that the AA strategy performed considerably worse, with the
larger drop in performance when there were large market shocks (see Days 8, 19 and 27 in Fig. 25). With the aggressiveness
ﬁxed at 0, the AA strategy can only adapt through its running estimate of the equilibrium price, which is signiﬁcantly slower
(especially when the equilibrium price changes considerably during large market shocks) than with the learning mechanism.
By so doing, we show that adapting the aggressiveness is central to the AA strategy.
Having looked at the aggressiveness model (that outputs τ given r and θ ), and the adaptive layer (that updates r and θ ),
we now need to describe the bidding layer where the agent forms a bid or an ask to submit in the market, based on the
current market conditions, its limit price and τ .
4.4. The bidding layer
In the bidding layer, the agent employs a set of bidding rules to decide whether or not to submit a bid or an ask, and at
what price if it decides to do so. If the buyer’s (seller’s) limit price is lower (higher) than the current obid (oask), it cannot
submit any bid (ask), and waits for the beginning of the next round. On the other hand, if the agent can submit a bid or ask
in the market, it considers its set of bidding rules to form a price. In this, we identify two cases when an agent bids: during
the ﬁrst trading round, where it cannot estimate the competitive equilibrium price, and the subsequent rounds where it
can. In particular, Fig. 10 gives the bidding rules, and Eqs. (10) and (11) detail the price formation process in the two cases:
bidi =
{
obid + (min{i,o+ask} − obid)/η if ﬁrst round, (10)
obid + (τ − obid)/η otherwise,
1714 P. Vytelingum et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 172 (2008) 1700–1729Fig. 9. The history of transaction prices and pˆ∗ (top plot), the short-term learning of r (middle plot) and the long-term learning of θ (bottom plot). Note
that we have a market shock on Day 11, with θ updated to match the change in price volatility.
ask j =
{
oask − (oask −max{c j,o−bid})/η if ﬁrst round,
oask − (oask − τ )/η otherwise,
(11)
where o+ask = (1 + λr)oask + λa , o−bid = (1 − λr)obid − λa and η ∈ [1,∞) is a constant that determines the rate of increase
(decrease) of the bids (asks).
At the beginning of the ﬁrst trading round, the agent has no information other than its limit price. Now, because if the
buyer submits too high a bid, it can transact at a not very proﬁtable price (with respect to p∗), it starts with low bids that
progressively approach the minimum of its limit price, i , and the outstanding ask, oask (see Eq. (11)) to explore the market.
Similarly, the seller, j, submits an ask towards the maximum of its cost price, c j , and the outstanding bid obid (see Eq. (10)).
Thus, the agent effectively reduces the bid-ask spread with an exponentially decreasing trend (since the bid increase should
be decreasing to reﬂect the decreasing bid-ask spread) determined by η and its limit price. Here, a low η implies a faster
rate of convergence of bids or asks until they are matched at a transaction price and, conversely, a high η implies a more
conservative bidding approach and a slower convergence. With the latter, while being more proﬁtable if it transacts, the
agent risks missing out on a transaction if other agents adopt a more conservative strategy (similar to that of an AA agent
with a lower η). However, with a lower η, the agent might be too hasty, and adopting a more conservative approach might
be more proﬁtable. In our simulations, we choose a value of 3 for η, which was observed to be a good compromise over a
multitude of environments. Furthermore, the buyer can only submit a bid if its limit price is higher than obid , or otherwise,
it remains idle until the beginning of the next round. We use similar intuitions to design the behaviour of the seller.
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if (i  obid) submit no bid
else
if (ﬁrst trading round) submit bid given by Eq. (10)
else
if (oask  τ ) accept oask
else submit bid given by Eq. (10)
Bidding Rules for Seller j:
if (c j  oask) submit no ask
else
if (ﬁrst trading round) submit ask given by Eq. (11)
else
if (obid  τ ) accept obid
else submit ask given by Eq. (11)
Fig. 10. Bidding rules.
After the ﬁrst trading round, the agent has an initial estimate of the competitive equilibrium price, which it subsequently
updates after each transaction. Initially, we set the agent’s aggressiveness factor, r, to 0 (meaning it adopts an active attitude)
because of the lack of market information. Based on the target price, τ , and the set of bidding rules that dictate how the
agent should react to the current market conditions, the trader then forms a bid or ask to submit in the market. In more
detail, if the target price is higher than the outstanding ask at any time during the bidding process, the buyer accepts the
outstanding ask (which is a better offer than it was targeting). Otherwise, it submits a bid, given by Eq. (10), that approaches
the (changing) target price in a similar manner as in the ﬁrst trading round. We use similar intuitions to design the seller’s
bidding rules. Here, if the target price is lower than the outstanding bid, the seller accepts the outstanding bid. Otherwise,
it submits an ask given by Eq. (11). Furthermore, as in the ﬁrst trading round, η affects the bidding process in a similar
manner and is set to 3 throughout the trading day.
Having described all the components of the AA strategy in detail, we now evaluate it in a number of different environ-
ments in the following section.
5. Empirical evaluation
In this section, we ﬁrst detail the methodology for analysing the strategic interaction of the AA agent in two different
types of populations; homogeneous in which all the agents adopt the same strategy and heterogeneous in which they adopt
different strategies. We then proceed to the actual empirical study of the strategies in these two cases. Finally, we apply our
strategy in a market based on real market data, where the demand and supply constantly changes. The purpose of this ﬁnal
exercise is to evaluate our strategy within a systematically dynamic environment, rather than with a single market shock as
per the ﬁrst part of this evaluation.
5.1. The methodology
There are two main parts to the methodology for benchmarking a strategy for the CDA: the market setup and the
empirical evaluation of the strategy or strategies adopted in the market. First, we describe the market setup, invariant of
the strategies adopted. Second, we describe how we analyse the strategic interactions of these agents (given the adopted
strategies in the market) and give the metrics we use to analyse the performance of a strategy in the market, in both
homogeneous and heterogeneous populations. Next, we discuss how we ensure statistical signiﬁcance in our empirical
study. Finally, we analyse the sensitivity of the parameters used in AA strategy using a standard sensitivity analysis.
5.1.1. The market setup
In all of our simulations, the market is populated by a set of 10 buyers and 10 sellers. In particular, we look at different
experiments with markets M1, M2, and M3, and market shocks MS14, MS21, MS31 and MS23 (see Section 2 for terminology)
and, ﬁnally, the real dynamic GOOG market (see Section 2). In the static environment, we only look at these three markets
as we would have the same behaviour in M4 as we would in M1 since there is only an upward shift in the demand and
supply and the absolute differences between the agents’ preferences remain the same. In the dynamic environment, on the
other hand, we are mostly interested in how the strategies adapt from their best behaviour in one market to their best
behaviour in the new market. Now, if we have more than one market shock, as in scenario MS214, we would observe how
the strategy adapts from M2 to M1 and ﬁnally to M4. Now, we would identify the same behaviour in MS21 and MS14 as
the agent’s behaviour at the end of MS21 would be the same as just before the shock in MS14. While we have a transitive
property, we do not have a reﬂective one. Thus, the observations from MS21 and MS12 would be different. Indeed, in the
former, we would observe how the agent adapts from the ﬂat supply of M2 to the normal supply of M1, while in the latter,
we would observe how it adapts from a normal to a ﬂat supply. However, due to space limitations, we only analyse in detail
a subset of the single market shocks, and generally look at how the agent adapts from an extreme to a normal demand or
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Finally, for the reasons outlined earlier, we also consider real market data. Speciﬁcally, we look at the real market (GOOG)
where the equilibrium price changes every trading day (see page 1704).
In most of our experiments, each buyer and seller is endowed with a single unit to buy or sell to induce the market
demand and supply found in M1, M2, M3, M4 or the GOOG market. Now, given markets with multi-unit allocation are
already intrinsically very eﬃcient, because of the size of the market,13 the challenge in this area is to improve the eﬃciency
of the smaller, less eﬃcient single-unit allocation market. Thus, we focus on single-unit allocation experiments in this paper
(as do almost all the previous work on the design of CDA strategies). Nevertheless, we do provide a multi-unit allocation
experiment in our GOOG market to ensure that AA still performs eﬃciently in such a dynamic setting.
Now, in all our experiments, each agent is endowed with a limit price corresponding to a unit of good to buy or sell. For
the static scenario, the CDA lasts 10 days. For the dynamic scenario, it lasts 20 days with the market demand and supply
kept constant during the ﬁrst 10 days and changed thereafter, effectively inducing a market shock on Day 11 (see Fig. 2 for
an example). For the homogeneous scenario, we can avoid redundancy in our experiments when evaluating the strategies
within a static environment for markets M1, M2 and M3, by looking at the performance of the strategies before the market
shocks for the dynamic cases. Given the market setup, we consider a statistically signiﬁcant number of runs of the CDA (see
Section 5.1.5 for more details), each lasting 10 or 20 trading days.
5.1.2. The agent setup
We now look at the agent setup. For the setup of the AA agents, based on simulations for a wide range of demand and
supply, we set the size of window of transactions (N) over which we calculate pˆ∗ to 5 (see Eq. (2)), the parameter η in the
bidding layer (see Eqs. (10) and (11)) to 3, and λa and λr (see Eq. (7)) to 0.01 and 0.02 respectively. The learning rates β1
and β2 (see Eqs. (7) and (8)) are drawn from a uniform distribution U(0.2,0.6) while γ is set to 2. Thus, by considering
the performance of AA for many different demand and supply situations, the ﬁxing of these parameters means they are not
ﬁne-tuned for any single market. Thus, in any given situation, superior performance could be obtained by optimising these
parameter choices to the prevailing situation. To emphasise this point still further, Section 5.1.6 investigates the sensitivity
of the performance to the choice of these parameters.
For GDX agents, the discount factor is set to 0.9 based on Tesauro and Bredin’s simulations (see [21] for more details)
and, ﬁnally, the ZIP agents are initialised with the set of parameters evolved in [4].
Given the market and agent setup, we now study how the choice of strategy determines an agent’s eﬃciency in different
environments. We do so for both homogeneous and heterogeneous populations.
5.1.3. Analysing eﬃciency in homogeneous populations
As discussed in Section 3, we believe that analysing the daily eﬃciency of the strategy provides more insights into how
effective a strategy is in learning from market interactions (as we can observe how the eﬃciency of the strategy is changing
as it is learning its best behaviour). This means our evaluation methodology does not favour the AA strategy, which was
designed to perform differently and better in the ‘ﬁrst round’ than the benchmarks (because we do not aggregate this
advantage in a single average eﬃciency measure). Now, as the agent learns to be more competitive in a static market and
the transaction prices converge towards the competitive equilibrium price, we expect its eﬃciency to improve. Thus, we
calculate the eﬃciency of a strategy at the end of each trading day, as well as the market volatility, α, calculated as Smith’s
α-parameter over all the transactions during each day (see Eq. (1)), which describes how the transaction prices converge at
the competitive equilibrium price.
5.1.4. Analysing eﬃciency in heterogeneous populations
Next, we describe our methodology for benchmarking strategies in heterogeneous environments. As in the homogeneous
case, we still need to determine performance of a strategy by its eﬃciency. However, unlike the homogeneous case, agents
do not all adopt the same strategy, and different numbers of buyers and sellers can adopt different strategies. Therefore, for
the reasons outlined in Section 3.2, the one-population EGT model is insuﬃcient and, thus, we adopt the two-population EGT
model we have previously developed to analyse buyers’ and sellers’ strategic interactions [25]. In more detail, this model
assumes that buyers and sellers will adopt the buyer and seller strategies that are the most eﬃcient for them in the market.
Thus, we calculate how the proportions of buyers and sellers adopting the different strategies change. In our two-population
EGT analysis, the ﬁrst step is to calculate the payoff table14 with the payoffs to each buyer and seller strategy given the
exhaustive set15 (of size 121) of the 10 buyers and 10 sellers adopting the different buyer and seller strategies. Given the
13 The eﬃciency of the CDA using ZI agents is only attributed to the eﬃciency of the market structure, rather than its behaviour. Given ZI agents, we
evaluated the eﬃciency of a ten-unit allocation at 99.3%, while that of a single-unit allocation market was 95.7%.
14 A more detailed description on computing the heuristic payoff table is given in [25] (see Chapter 6), with an example of the heuristic payoff table (see
Appendix A).
15 The size of the payoff table is given by
(Ab+Sb−1
Ab
)× (As+Ss−1As ) where Sb is the number of buyer strategies, Ss is the number of seller strategies, Ab is
the number of buyers and As is the number of sellers (see [25] for more details).
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different buyer and seller strategies (if these strategies are more eﬃcient) changes, and the mixed-Nash equilibrium of the
CDA game that describes the particular proportion mix where it does not pay for any agent to adopt another strategy.
Together, the replicator dynamics and the mixed-Nash equilibrium allow us to analyse the performance of the different
strategies over all population mixes (and not only in a balanced population) and they also indicate how the population
mixes will change as buyers and sellers adopt the more eﬃcient of the strategies at the different mixes. Speciﬁcally, the
following equations describe how we calculate the buyer’s dynamics p˙h , and the seller’s dynamics q˙k:
p˙h =
[
ub(e
h, p,q) − ub(p, p,q)
]
ph,
q˙k =
[
us(e
k,q, p) − us(q,q, p)
]
qk, (12)
where p denotes the buyer’s mixed strategy and ph is the probability that the buyer adopts pure buyer strategy h. q
denotes the seller’s mixed strategy and qk is the probability that the buyer adopts pure buyer strategy k. p˙ = {p˙1, p˙2, . . .} is
the replicator dynamics along the buyer axis and q˙ = {q˙1, q˙2, . . .} the dynamics along the seller axis.
Furthermore, the mixed-Nash equilibrium of the analysis is given as the (p,q) that minimises Eq. (13):
v(p,q) =
Sb∑
h=1
(
max
[
ub(e
h, p,q) − ub(p, p,q),0
]
ph
)2 + Ss∑
k=1
(
max
[
us(e
k,q, p) − us(q,q, p),0
]
qk
)2
. (13)
Other deﬁnitions that are relevant to the EGT analysis include:
Deﬁnition 16. A trajectory is the change in mixed strategy, starting from a particular mixed strategy, and following the
replicator dynamics.
Deﬁnition 17. An attractor is a mixed-Nash equilibrium towards which the replicator dynamics (trajectories) converge.
Deﬁnition 18. A saddle point is a mixed-Nash equilibrium from which replicator dynamics (trajectories) diverge.
Deﬁnition 19. A basin of attraction of a mixed-Nash equilibrium is the space of mixed strategies from which trajectories
will converge to that equilibrium.
Now, while the two-population EGT model can be used to analyse the interaction of any number of buyer and seller
strategies, a visual representation of the analysis is possible for up to two different buyer and two different seller strategies
since an analysis of three buyer and three seller strategies would be in four dimensions. Though Walsh et al.’s model would
allow a visual analysis with up to three strategies (assuming that these strategies can be used for both buying and selling),
it is inaccurate as outlined in Section 3.2. For these reason and, as is common practice in related work on the bidding
strategies for the CDA [21,22,27], we compare the performance of two strategies at a time.
5.1.5. Statistical signiﬁcance
In all cases, we consider a statistically signiﬁcant number of runs, 2500, of the CDA. We validate our results at the 95%-
conﬁdence-interval by running the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum test [14] on the daily eﬃciency of the strategies and
on the difference between the actual and the expected payoff ([ub(eh, p,q) − ub(p, p,q)]) in heterogeneous populations.
We chose such a test because we cannot ensure the normality of our data set and because we want to ensure statistical
signiﬁcance of our dynamic analysis particularly around mixed-Nash equilibria where that difference is signiﬁcantly smaller.
Finally, we provide error bars at the 95%-conﬁdence interval in the daily eﬃciency of strategies within homogeneous popu-
lations (as shown in Fig. 12).
5.1.6. Sensitivity analysis
We also investigate how sensitive our parameters are using a standard one-at-a-time sensitivity analysis [19] (where we
separately vary the different parameters). In particular, we do a sensitivity analysis in two different markets (see Fig. 11),
namely the dynamic GOOG market (with a changing equilibrium price) and the static M1 market (with a static expected
equilibrium price). In the former case, we observe that N and η are the only sensitive parameters, while in the latter case
only η is sensitive. Thus, depending on the type of market we are considering, η and N have to be carefully chosen to
maximise the eﬃciency. Having said that, we also observed that suitable values for η and N in both static and dynamic
markets can be identiﬁed (which we set to 3.0 and 4 respectively here).
5.2. Performance in homogeneous environments
First, we consider the homogeneous scenario. In Figs. 12 to 15, we look at the performance of the AA strategy and the
benchmarks GDX and ZIP in the different markets highlighted earlier, and Table 1 details the eﬃciency of the buyers and
1718 P. Vytelingum et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 172 (2008) 1700–1729Fig. 11. Sensitivity analysis of parameters in the static M1 market on the left and in the dynamic GOOG market on the right.
Fig. 12. Scenario MS14. The market eﬃciency of AA is 0.992, of ZIP, 0.979 and of GDX, 0.988. If we consider the static scenario for Market M1, the market
eﬃciency of AA is 0.997, of ZIP 0.982, and of GDX 0.990.
Fig. 13. Scenario MS21. The market eﬃciency of AA is 0.993, of ZIP 0.974, and of GDX 0.987. If we consider the static scenario for Market M2, the market
eﬃciency of AA is 0.992, of ZIP 0.971, and of GDX, 0.981.
P. Vytelingum et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 172 (2008) 1700–1729 1719Fig. 14. Scenario MS31. The market eﬃciency of AA is 0.996, of ZIP 0.968, and of GDX 0.987. If we consider the static scenario for Market M3, the market
eﬃciency of AA is 0.996, of ZIP 0.960, and of GDX 0.981.
Fig. 15. Scenario MS23. The market eﬃciency of AA is 0.994, of ZIP 0.968, and of GDX 0.980. As in MS21, when we consider the static scenario in the ﬁrst
10 days, the market eﬃciency of AA is 0.992, of ZIP 0.971, and of GDX, 0.981.
Table 1
Eﬃciency of strategies in homogeneous environments (over all trading days)
Scenario AA GDX ZIP
buyer seller all buyer seller all buyer seller all
M1 0.969 1.025 0.997 0.981 0.998 0.990 1.010 0.960 0.982
M2 1.212 0.459 0.992 1.145 0.708 0.981 1.143 0.660 0.971
M3 0.389 1.247 0.996 0.595 1.161 0.981 0.896 1.069 0.960
MS14 1.044 0.981 0.992 1.022 0.989 0.988 1.033 0.980 0.979
MS21 1.088 0.754 0.993 1.054 0.876 0.987 1.085 0.817 0.974
MS31 0.667 1.159 0.996 0.778 1.103 0.987 0.932 1.049 0.968
MS23 0.968 1.250 0.994 0.894 1.228 0.980 1.015 0.863 0.968
the sellers, and the eﬃciency of all the agents in these markets. Note that apart from the symmetric Market M1, buyers
do not expect the same proﬁt as sellers due to the asymmetric nature of the demand and supply, and, thus, the eﬃciency
of the strategy is not the average of the buyers’ and sellers’ eﬃciency. By dissecting the eﬃciency of the buyers and the
sellers separately, we can observe whether the buyers or the sellers are performing better given the particular demand and
supply.
5.2.1. The static scenario
We ﬁrst analyse the eﬃciency of the strategies within a static environment, with markets M1, M2 and M3. In M1 (see
Day 1 to 10 in Fig. 12), we can see that our strategy outperforms both benchmarks on every trading day, with an average
eﬃciency of 0.997. We also note that with AA agents, the transaction prices converge faster (with a lower α) and, on
average, remain closer to p∗ than with GDX or ZIP agents (AA has the smallest α on Day 10). On the ﬁrst day, we observe
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a conservative approach (submit bid and ask with a slowing increasing trend) and they have a faster update of their target
price. ZIP makes no such assumption and starts with a random proﬁt margin, while GDX suffers from the lack of information
(bids, asks and transaction prices). After a few days, the eﬃciency of all three strategies converges to some value, which
is highest with AA agents, and lowest with ZIP. This validates our market setup of 10 days for each market, since we can
observe that even if we would consider a larger number of days, the eﬃciency of the subsequent days would not change.
Furthermore, it also validates our analytical method to look at daily eﬃciency, since we can observe that the eﬃciency
is different on different days for different strategies. Moreover, the daily eﬃciency converges to different maxima for each
strategy, suggesting that the AA strategy is best at learning to be more eﬃcient in the market. With the traditional analytical
method (as detailed in Section 3), we would only calculate the average eﬃciency over all the trading days and would not
observe the fact that eﬃciency is capped after a few trading days to a maximum, while strategies like AA and GDX learn to
be eﬃcient at a much faster rate than ZIP.
In markets M2 and M3 (see days 1 to 10 in Figs. 13 and 14), we also observe that AA is the most eﬃcient (99.7% in
M1, 99.1% in M2 and 99.6% in M3). In particular, it does much better than the other strategies in asymmetric markets than
it does in the symmetric Market M1 (around 2.1% better in asymmetric cases, compared to 1.1% better in the symmetric
case—see Table 1). This is because the competitive equilibrium price does not change signiﬁcantly and, thus, the target price
remains close to p∗ on Day 11. The competitive equilibrium price still changes, as we are dealing with uniformly distributed
limit prices, and the non-deterministic demand and supply is expected to be as in M1 to M4. However, in these asymmetric
markets, the α-parameter of AA is the highest, while being lowest in the symmetric market. We explain this difference by
separately considering the buyers’ and the sellers’ eﬃciencies (see Table 1). In Market M2 (with a ﬂat supply curve), the
fact that the buyers’ eﬃciency is higher than the sellers’ means that the transaction prices are, on average, less than p∗ ,
with the buyers having more proﬁtable transactions. This, in turn, indicates that the buyers are more successful at driving
the market price (i.e. forcing transaction prices to be lower and be more proﬁtable from their perspective) when the supply
is ﬂat. We make similar observations with Market M3 which has a ﬂat demand curve. While α is still highest for AA, the
AA sellers’ eﬃciency is higher than the AA buyers’, indicating that sellers are driving the market price to be higher than p∗ ,
and are being more proﬁtable from their perspective. As with M1, the daily eﬃciency converges with all three strategies,
with AA still having the highest eﬃciency on Day 10.
5.2.2. The dynamic scenario
We now analyse the daily eﬃciency of strategies when faced with market shocks. At the beginning of Day 11, the
strategies are all tailored to perform best in Day 10. Now, with a market shock, the conditions to which those strategies
have adapted are different, forcing those agents to relearn the best strategic behaviour in the market. Essentially, a robust
strategy should be able to rapidly adapt to the new market conditions, since the longer it takes to do this, the more
ineﬃcient it is.
In scenario MS14 (see Fig. 12), the market demand and supply structure remains the same, with an increase in the
competitive equilibrium price p∗ . In this case, on average, AA still outperforms the benchmarks with an eﬃciency of 0.992.
Because there is a signiﬁcant shift of p∗ , we observe a signiﬁcant decrease in the eﬃciency of the AA strategy, as p∗
has to be re-estimated gradually (as transaction prices diverge from the old equilibrium and converge to the new one).
However, with the higher α, and thus a lower θ , the AA target price changes at a faster rate than it would with a ﬁxed
θ (see Section 4.2), forcing transaction prices to converge at a faster rate to the new p∗ . Here, we also observe that the
eﬃciency of the benchmarks, GDX and ZIP on Day 11, is only slightly better than AA, though the latter’s eﬃciency improves
after a few trading days to be better than the benchmarks. This can be explained by the fact that pˆ∗ is a fundamental
parameter of the AA strategy, such that a signiﬁcant change in p∗ affects its performance. Furthermore, AA and GDX have
the highest α because p∗ is central to the AA’s aggressiveness model, and because GDX’s belief function approximates
a step function at p∗ . On the other hand, ZIP does not consider p∗ explicitly when it forms a bid or an ask. In fact, it
only considers its latest proﬁt margin on Day 10 when starting to bid (with a new limit price given the market shock) on
Day 11.
In scenario MS21 (see Fig. 13) where p∗ does not change signiﬁcantly, we initially have a ﬂat supply followed by a
symmetric demand and supply. Again, AA performs best with the highest average eﬃciency and it is the most eﬃcient
strategy with the fastest adaptivity to the new market conditions (with the lowest α). Indeed, GDX and AA have the low-
est α, which is considerably smaller than in scenario MS14 where p∗ changes signiﬁcantly. ZIP suffers the most from a
market shock, with a signiﬁcant drop in eﬃciency and slow adaptability. This is because ZIP reuses the same proﬁt margin
at the beginning of the following day, and given the signiﬁcant change in preferences (limit prices) after a market shock, its
proﬁt margin is no longer tailored for the new market, and the decrease in eﬃciency then depends on how different the
preferences in the two consecutive markets are. Thus, the decrease is considerable as we are looking at an extreme change
for the sellers’ preferences. We observe similar behaviour for the three strategies in scenario MS31, with AA outperforming
the other strategies.
Furthermore, AA outperformed the benchmarks with the best margin in scenario MS23 (see Fig. 15), where the market
goes from a ﬂat supply to a ﬂat demand. ZIP suffers considerably here as the proﬁt margin, which had been tailored to
Market M2, is now used in Market M3 at the beginning of Day 11. With the supply curve now ranging from 1.5 to 4.5
(rather than between 2.8 and 3.2), the same set of sellers’ proﬁt margins gives a wider range of asks that are no longer
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proﬁtable in the market. On the other hand, GDX and AA do not suffer such a drastic change in α as ZIP does. Indeed, we
observe that the magnitude of the peak in α on Day 11 for GDX and AA in MS14 is about twice that in MS21 and MS31
where we change either the demand or the supply curve, while there is no peak when we change both the demand and
supply curves in MS23. We explain this by considering the limit prices of buyers and sellers. Indeed, in MS14, even though
the market demand and supply remain the same, the buyers’ and sellers’ individual preferences change drastically, with
the extreme case where extra-marginal traders become intra-marginal and intra-marginal traders become extra-marginal.
In MS21 with a ﬂat supply (MS31 with a ﬂat demand) the change in sellers’ (buyers’) preferences is not as signiﬁcant as
buyers’ (sellers’). Since market behaviour is affected by both buyers’ and sellers’ behaviours, the change in preferences is
then reﬂected in the change of market eﬃciency and α. Thus, in MS23 with no extreme changes in demand and supply
observed in MS14, in demand in MS21 and in supply in MS31, the drop in eﬃciency for GDX and AA is even smaller, with
no peak in α on Day 11.
5.3. Performance in heterogeneous environments
Here, we look at the EGT plots for different scenarios in static and dynamics environments, given the methodology out-
lined in Section 5.1.4. Now, because we consider only pairwise comparisons, a visual representation of the above equations
is possible, and an example is given in Fig. 16, where we have two sub-plots. The left sub-plot gives the replicator dynam-
ics of the analysis, with the vertices corresponding to different pure strategies, and its shading denotes the magnitude of
the dynamics given the mixed strategies of the buyers and sellers. As the magnitude of the dynamics decreases (and the
shading is darker), there is less and less incentive to deviate to another strategy, until the magnitude is 0 at a mixed-Nash
equilibrium and then, it does not pay off to deviate to another buyer or seller strategy. Note that trajectories (see Deﬁ-
nition 16) can converge towards or diverge from a darker region, depending on whether that region contains an attractor
or a saddle point. Finally, the right sub-plot gives the magnitude of the buyer’s and seller’s dynamics, with a mixed-Nash
equilibrium occurring when the magnitude of both dynamics is 0. In particular, we consider these magnitudes to compare
the buyer’s and seller’s payoffs when deviating to the more eﬃcient strategy, which is particularly insightful when we have
an asymmetric demand and supply, as we will now see.
5.3.1. The static scenario
First, we evaluate the strategies in a static scenario with no market shock, and in turn consider populations with AA
against ZIP, and AA against GDX. In Market M1 with AA and ZIP agents, we have a single mixed-Nash equilibrium at AA
(see Fig. 16), implying that all buyers and sellers adopt the dominant AA strategy. We also observe that the dynamics have
comparable magnitudes and that the magnitude of buyer’s dynamics is higher when AA sellers are in the majority, and
that the seller’s dynamics are higher when AA buyers are in the majority (with higher magnitude here implying faster
convergence to AA). Thus, here, AA agents are most eﬃcient when they are in the majority. Similarly, with AA and GDX
agents in M1, we have a single attractor (mixed-Nash equilibrium towards which trajectories converge) at A and saddle
points (mixed-Nash equilibrium that trajectories diverge away from) as can be seen in Fig. 17, with the majority of buy-
ers and sellers eventually adopting the AA strategy (and only 4% of buyers and 21% of sellers adopting GDX). Here, the
magnitude of convergence to A is highest when there are a majority of GDX buyers and sellers, implying that AA buyers
and sellers are most eﬃcient when they are in the minority. We also observe that buyers and sellers do not necessarily
select the same buyer and seller strategy respectively (e.g., when AA buyers and ZIP sellers are in the majority, buy-
ers tend to deviate to ZIP, and sellers to AA), which would not have been identiﬁed with the traditional one-population
model.
Next, we look at Market M2 with a ﬂat supply. With a population of AA and ZIP (see Fig. 18), we have a single dominant
strategy, A, with all buyers and sellers adopting AA. The obvious observation here is that the magnitude of the seller’s
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sellers are more likely to adopt the AA strategy, with a relatively small proportion adopting the GDX strategy. The magnitudes of the buyer’s and seller’s
dynamics are comparable.
Fig. 18. Scenario M2 with AA and ZIP agents. Here, we have a dominant strategy at (0,0). All buyers and sellers eventually adopt the AA strategy. The
magnitude of the seller’s dynamics is considerable smaller than that of the buyer’s.
Fig. 19. Scenario M2 with AA and GDX agents. Here, we have two attractors: A at (1,1) and B at (0.92,0), and a saddle point C at (0.93,0.10). The area of
the basin of attraction for A is 0.884, and for B is 0.116. The magnitude of the seller’s dynamics is higher when GDX buyers are in majority, and considerably
lower as AA buyers are represented more.
dynamics is considerably smaller than that of the buyer’s. This suggests that there is more economic incentive for buyers to
adopt AA than for sellers to do so. This happens because of the market’s ﬂat supply, meaning the sellers’ have considerably
lower expected proﬁts than buyers, and, thus, gain less in proﬁt when deviating to another seller strategy (in contrast with
the buyer case). Furthermore, we observe that when the majority of buyers adopt ZIP, the sellers tend to adopt ZIP, and
when the majority of buyers adopt AA, the sellers tend to adopt AA.
Now, with a population of AA and GDX in M2 (see Fig. 19), we have two equilibria, A at (0.92,0) and B at (1,1). Because
the basin of attraction of A is considerably larger than that of B, there is an equally larger probability (0.884 compared
P. Vytelingum et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 172 (2008) 1700–1729 1723Fig. 20. Scenario MS14 with AA and ZIP agents. Here, we have two attractors: A at (0,0), B at (1,1) and a saddle point, C at (1,0.78). The area of the basin
of attraction of A is 0.978, and that of B is 0.022.
Fig. 21. Scenario MS14 with AA and GDX agents. Here, we have two attractors: A at (1,1), B at (0,0) and a saddle point, C at (0,0.34). The area of the
basin of attraction for A is 0.935 and that of B is 0.065.
to 0.116) that the mixed-Nash strategy A will be adopted (and all agents will eventually select AA). Thus, there is still a
small probability of 0.116 that 8.0% of buyers will adopt GDX and all sellers will adopt GDX, such that AA is not dominant.
When we consider the magnitude of the dynamics, we observe that the sellers’ magnitude is considerably smaller than the
buyers’, and we explain this with the same intuition as with AA and ZIP in M2. Furthermore, when GDX buyers are in the
majority, the sellers are more inclined to adopt GDX, and when AA buyers are in the majority, sellers tend to adopt AA,
though if GDX sellers are in the majority, then sellers are likely to adopt GDX.
Now, because of the reﬂective nature of M2 and M3, we only report on our analysis of the strategic performance in
M2. However, we observe reﬂective behaviours in M3 (see Appendix A), with the magnitude of the buyers’ dynamics being
considerably smaller than the sellers’ in this case.
5.3.2. The dynamic scenario
We now turn to the performance of the strategies in dynamic environments with market shocks. In particular, we look
at scenarios MS14 and MS21, and provide further results for MS31 and MS23 in the appendix (which further validate our
claim that AA is better than both ZIP and GDX).
In scenario MS14 with AA and ZIP strategies (see Fig. 20), we have two attractors at A and B, and a saddle point at C.
The basin of attraction of A is considerably larger than that of B, with the higher probability of 0.978 that all the buyers
and sellers will eventually adopt the AA strategy. As in M1, the magnitude of the buyer’s and seller’s dynamics is highest
when AA agents are in the majority, which again suggests that AA is most eﬃcient when it is in the majority. Furthermore,
as in M1, we observe that the magnitude of the buyer’s and the seller’s dynamics are comparable, and this is because we
are still dealing with symmetric markets where buyers and sellers expect similar payoffs. However, unlike in M1, AA is no
longer dominant, and there is now a small probability of 0.022 that ZIP will be eventually adopted in the market. Similarly,
with AA against GDX in MS14 (see Fig. 21), we have two attractors at A and B, and a saddle point at C, and the basin of
attraction is much larger for attractor A. As with AA against ZIP, the market shock causes AA to no longer be dominant, and
there is now a small probability of 0.065 that GDX will be eventually adopted in the market.
1724 P. Vytelingum et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 172 (2008) 1700–1729Fig. 22. Scenario MS21 with AA and ZIP agents. Here, we have two attractors: A at (0,0), B at (1,1) and a saddle point, C at (0.68,1). The area of the basin
of attraction of A is 0.961, and that of B is 0.039.
Fig. 23. Scenario MS21 with AA and GDX agents. Here, we have two attractors: A at (1,1) and B (0,0), and two saddle points: C at (0.55,0) and D at
(0.33,0.11). The area of the basin of attraction of A is 0.869, and that of B is 0.136.
In scenario MS21 (see Figs. 22 and 23), where the supply changes, we observe a similar set of attractors as in MS14 (but
with a probability of 0.961 that AA will be adopted against ZIP, and a probability of 0.869 that it will be adopted against
GDX). However, the dynamics of how these equilibria are reached differ, with sellers having a slight tendency to adopt more
ZIP or GDX than in MS14 when AA buyers are in the minority. In that case, the magnitude of the seller’s replicator dynamics
is higher than that of the buyer’s (because of the asymmetric demand and supply, and sellers expect higher proﬁts than
buyers) and thus inﬂuence more the dynamics of the CDA. As the AA buyer strategy becomes increasingly popular, the
buyer’s dynamics have increasingly more weight and increasingly inﬂuence the dynamics of the market. In some cases (in
the basin of attraction of equilibrium B), the change in dynamic is not suﬃciently in favour of AA buyers, and the GDX and
ZIP buyers then take over.
5.4. Performance in real markets
For the reasons outlined at the end of Section 2, we now analyse the strategies in the GOOG and the GOOGshock market.
The aim of this exercise is to observe how the eﬃciency of the different strategies changes given a demand and supply that
changes on a daily basis for single-allocation and multi-allocation scenarios.
As can be seen in Fig. 24, AA outperforms ZIP and GDX in both single-allocation and multi-allocation scenarios. In a
market populated solely with AA traders, the eﬃciency is typically higher than 99.9% even in the presence of market shocks
in both scenarios (with the eﬃciency of the multi-allocation scenario being, as expected, considerably higher). Furthermore,
when we consider the more dynamic GOOGshock market with considerably larger changes in the equilibrium price (as
a result of a market shock lasting several trading days) and asymmetric demand and supply (see Fig. 25), AA performs
considerably better than GDX and ZIP (by a margin of 5.2% and 3.3%, respectively), demonstrating its superiority even in
highly dynamic markets. Furthermore, we also notice that ZIP now outperforms GDX, suggesting that it performs better
given more variable environments. It further suggests that adaptive strategies, such as AA and ZIP, are more eﬃcient in
very changing markets than belief-based strategies, such as GDX, which have to build a belief of a market that is constantly
changing and, therefore, can possibly never catch up with the actual situation.
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are given as the change in equilibrium prices.
Fig. 25. Eﬃciency in the GOOGshock market (we ignore the ﬁrst few days when agents are still very ineﬃcient). Note that the changes in equilibrium price
are considerably higher than in the GOOG market (see Fig. 24). The thin dotted line represents the eﬃciency of the AA strategy when it is always active
(aggressiveness level ﬁxed at 0).
In summary, we observe that AA is the most eﬃcient strategy and, therefore, the one most likely to be eventually
adopted by the population of buyers and sellers in the market. This is true for all the market environments we have tested
and not just the examples shown here.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we presented a novel adaptive-aggressiveness strategy, AA, that software agents can use to bid in Contin-
uous Double Auctions. The AA strategy is principally based on a short-term and a long-term learning of the agent’s bidding
behaviour. For the short-term learning, the motivation was to immediately respond to ﬂuctuations in the market conditions,
and the agent updates the aggressiveness of its bidding behaviour based on market information observed after every bid or
ask appears in the market. The motivation for the long-term learning mechanism, on the other hand, was to respond to
more systematic changes in the market conditions and, in particular, to market shocks. To achieve this, our strategy updates
an aggressiveness model that determines how the agent’s degree of aggressiveness inﬂuences its choice of bids or asks to
submit in the market, based on market information observed after every successful transaction.
We then went on to describe a novel methodology for benchmarking the eﬃciency of strategies in homogeneous popu-
lations by considering daily eﬃciency and price volatility, rather than simply the overall eﬃciency as in previous work. Our
approach provided more insights into how the learning mechanisms of the strategies affect their eﬃciencies in the market.
In particular, we showed how the eﬃciencies of strategies change as they learn to be more eﬃcient in the market or when
there is a market shock. These would not have been observable using the standard approach because it calculates only the
average market eﬃciency over all trading days and compares the (scalar) eﬃciencies of different strategies. We also pro-
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model for a comprehensive analysis of buyer’s and seller’s choices of strategy in the market. In particular, we looked at
the separate evolution of buyer’s and seller’s strategies in the market. Again this would not be observable in the traditional
one-population approach because it assumes that buyers and sellers adopt the same strategy in the market and, thus, the
evolution of buyers’ and sellers’ strategies is the same. Furthermore, this work also represents the ﬁrst attempt to analyse
the strategic interactions of agents in dynamic environments with different symmetric and asymmetric demand and supply.
This is an advance over the analysis that is typically performed in heterogeneous populations with a static setting (i.e. no
market shock) and only a symmetric demand and supply.
Using these methods, we benchmarked our AA strategy against the state of the art ZIP and GDX strategies. In so doing,
we empirically demonstrated how it outperforms these benchmarks in different static and dynamic environments, in both
homogeneous and heterogeneous populations. Speciﬁcally, within homogeneous populations, the AA strategy outperformed
the benchmarks, in terms of market eﬃciency, by up to 3.6% in the static case and 2.8% in the dynamic case. Furthermore,
we empirically showed the AA outperforms the state of the art GDX by 5.2% and ZIP by 3.3% in a market based on real
market data. It is interesting to point out that learning strategies such as AA and ZIP are relatively more eﬃcient in the
dynamic situations such as the GOOGshock market than the belief-based GDX strategy. This is so because GDX has to update
its whole (non-scalar) belief of the market every trading day and therefore it is slower in adapting to these variable market
conditions than AA or ZIP which simply learn their (scalar) aggressiveness and proﬁt margin respectively and are better able
to adapt to drastically changing market conditions. Finally, within heterogeneous populations, based on our evolutionary
game theoretic analysis, we showed out that there was a probability above 85% that the AA strategy will eventually be
adopted by buyers and sellers in the market.
For future work, we ﬁrst will study the use of other selection mechanisms than the Replicator Dynamics, including
mutation and cross-over. Second, and more importantly, we intend to consider the use of the AA strategy in more complex
variants of the CDA, and in particular ﬁnancial exchanges such as the NYSE or NASDAQ. This would entail considering the
additional (or lack of) information in these variants and modifying AA accordingly. The particular complication we foresee
with the real ﬁnancial markets would be in terms of being robust to market shocks, which rather than occurring over
trading days as in our model of the CDA, occur over trading hours, such that we would require a more complex equilibrium
estimator with some form of trend analysis. Thereon, we intend to show how parameters including λa , λr , γ , β1 and β2, η
and N can be ﬁne-tuned for particular markets by adopting a similar evolutionary approach as Cliff’s [5] using a GA-search.
In real markets, such ﬁne-tuning is today’s norm in a very competitive environment where improvements of the order of
0.01% are highly desirable (and translate into proﬁts of hundreds of thousands of pounds in the investment banking industry
with annual trading proﬁts worth billions of dollars).
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Appendix A. Empirical study within a heterogeneous population
In Section 5, we benchmarked the AA strategy against the state of the art ZIP and GDX strategies for different scenarios.
Here, we provide an analysis of AA against ZIP and GDX in the remaining cases that have not been considered in the main
Fig. A.1. Scenario M3 with AA and ZIP agents. Here, we have one attractor: A at (0,0). AA is a dominant strategy that will eventually be adopted in the
market.
P. Vytelingum et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 172 (2008) 1700–1729 1727Fig. A.2. Scenario M3 with AA and GDX agents. Here, we have one attractor: A at (1,1) and one saddle point: B at (0,0.81). AA is a dominant strategy that
will eventually be adopted in the market.
Fig. A.3. Scenario MS31 with AA and ZIP agents. Here, we have two attractors: A at (0,0) and B at (1,1) and a saddle point: C at (1,0.80). The probability
that A will be adopted is 0.952 and that B will be adopted is 0.048.
Fig. A.4. Scenario MS31 with AA and GDX agents. Here, we have three attractors: A at (1,1), B at (0,0) and C at (0,1) and two saddle points: D at (0.19,1)
and E at (0,0.40). The probability that A will be adopted is 0.776, that B will be adopted is 0.125 and that C will be adopted is 0.099.
body of the paper. For each case, we give the different attractors and saddle points and the probability that each of these
attractors will be adopted. We observe that AA always outperforms ZIP and GDX in line with our observations in the main
body of the paper.
1728 P. Vytelingum et al. / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 172 (2008) 1700–1729Fig. A.5. Scenario MS23 with AA and ZIP agents. Here, we have two attractors: A at (0,0) and B at (1,1) and a saddle point: C at (0.80,0.95). The
probability that A will be adopted is 0.965 and that B will be adopted is 0.035.
Fig. A.6. Scenario MS23 with AA and GDX agents. Here, we have three attractors: A at (0,0), B at (1,1) and C at (0.32,0) and two saddle points: D at
(0.37,0.04) and E at (0.03,0). The probability that A will be adopted is 0.010, that B will be adopted is 0.902 and that C will be adopted is 0.088.
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